analytic philosophy basis

Analytic philosophy basis

        Philosophers have called analysts, Cambridge, Lwow, Warsaw, Vienna, Prague, Oxford, Pittsburgh, Princeton .. they have in common the idea that some kind of philosophical analysis, or that philosophy is analysis. The key words "sentence", "proposal", "meaning" point soon the linguistic character of the company. We do not confuse with the resolution of a concept using analytic judgments, or Kant's transcendental analysis, or with the philosophical analysis of Lagneau.

       Traditionally, philosophers do not agree on the nature of their problems, nor on the kind of solution that suits them, nor the type of evidence that characterizes their argument. The most obvious result of the "revolution" analytical, as we called the British reaction to some fifty years of Hegelianism was reduced a little and for a time the extent of disagreement. It would have taken a better idea of ​​philosophical activity, more unified its modus operandi and its domain. Philosophical questions, typologically distinct empirical questions as formal questions, call a logical clarification of thought and thus illumination of the ultimate nature of the facts. A new method has been discovered, the analysis, not to be confused with the analysis or hardware wise, nor with the formal analysis of the logician. The object of philosophy is what was technically called a second level domain (a second-order subject). Mean that his case is not to describe, explain or change the world, or even produce a new kind of statements, but we offer an analysis of the meaning of scientific statements and common sense that we do not doubt. Analysts are not intended to discourage speculative and intuitive approaches, they care very little remains of the debate with traditional and continental philosophy.

        They form the tradition for over sixty years has centered around two issues seemingly modest: What do you mean? and How do we know? ("What do you mean?" And "How do we know?"). It immediately evokes the Socratic inquiry and one wonders what characterizes these new conceptual research, we consider the quest Kantian foundation and we would like to discover what distinguishes philosophical analysis of this critical project. It is not enough to note that the second question presupposes them for the first and the latter a more explicit: How do we speak? ("How do we talk?"). This is how we came to this agreement which is minimal at first a survey on the philosophy of language. This survey will be conducted to describe the origins, forms of philosophical analysis, the phases of its history, the poles of its interests, and releasing from its presuppositions strong philosophical thought.

1. Origins and beginnings:

      It was in England that the movement of the "analytic philosophy" made himself known as such, is pointing when it occurs as a breakdown and reaction to a philosophical school. However, the origins are elsewhere.

       The analytical approach and linguistic philosophy, which announced Locke and Condillac found, meant a new approach to language which was acquired in science at least one hundred fifty years earlier. A history of science that aims story concepts could be a linguistic history of science. We would see that the revolutions of these are related to the introduction of a new language, itself secured new categories (Galileo), that their progress depends on the improvement of their nomenclature (Lavoisier), their vocabulary (Linnaeus), a change, or even "rape" language (Riemann), may cause a disruption conceptual theoretical extension generator (non-Euclidean geometry), their theories are reflected in the structure of their equations (Poincaré Maxwell), even before completing their axiomatization does reveal the linguistic nature of the problems themselves. In short, if you go back to the origins of beginnings, it appears that analytic philosophy is that the emergence of thinking in terms of awareness much earlier the importance of language in theory progress, obstacles and epistemological ruptures of European science.

          In philosophy, this revolution was only possible thanks to a social and cultural evolution. Secularization of culture, professionalization of philosophy is such a revolution a matter of philosophers who publish in journals, submit to the expert critical colleagues, gained their independence from any "belief", ensuring their independence from theology, politics, and psychology, and institutionally first constituting a faculty. In terms of discipline, three influences rushed this new philosophy of philosophy. First, the logic was evading the science of the mind. Logicians and mathematicians such as Frege, Husserl, Russell, release of mathematical truth and logical empiricism involved psychologism heirs of John Stuart Mill. Second, psychology is the science and rejects inductive philosophy as a science of the mind. Finally, two students of Brentano, Meinong and Husserl, apply to acts of the a priori intellectual consciousness of intentionality and the philosophy are investigating the objects of thought, meaning, opening - between psychology as a science actions and mental states and physical sciences and biological objects and physical events - a special area that is claimed by any other science, the third kingdom of concepts as logical objects, classes, implications truths ...

         After his subject, there was this philosophy to conquer his method influenced by preanalytical these themes, but reviving a tradition strictly British, Moore and Russell deviate from the intentional and eidetic analysis. Moore wants to give "correct analysis" of a number of proposals of common sense once included in their "ordinary meaning." But one thing is to understand one another to give a correct analysis of "this is good" or "this is a table." Russell is responsible for the review of key concepts of formal logic and arithmetic: all, some, anyone, one, the, not, is identical to exists, if, and, or, as ... The elimination of psychologism required the use of realism, but it was still necessary to distinguish the real constituents of discourse here is the gist of the analysis.

2. Identification Criteria:

       List some keywords, a method name, specify a domain, identify influences and origins, it is not the defining analytic philosophy. It is significant that critical presentation, no philosophical history have so far been tempted, general presentations made by analysts prefer to identify features (features) that describe a movement rather than the characters that define a school. Some are the term analytic philosophy to the crisis of the Cambridge school in England, his collusion with Marxism in Poland, others have what can be called the Oxford school as his heir. For Mr. Urmson, all analysts are procession in Austin. For Russell, there is nothing to find intelligible in recent practice, purely linguistic, whose doctrines are positive and negative trivial unfounded. Therefore be avoided to conduct the analysis of the movement according to one or more of these readings. We use the terminology received by most analysts, indicating the items where there is a full account of what is treated here by reference, reporting analyzes have more or less value paradigm.

           Failing to define it, we can agree on three criteria to identify this movement. First, it is characterized by a minimalist attitude towards philosophical problems. Its precise statements on how formal rarely involve traditional formulations, they give rise to detailed discussions and limited almost scholastic style. It does not present a doctrine expressed in a long theoretical work likely to interest a large audience, but short essays, or simply private conferences with colleagues. We do not build large syntheses using the powers of the analogy at the expense of simple logic. We propose to reflect on "some questions about knowing and thinking" or "two probable direction." You can see in the recognition of the active role of language in philosophy the second criterion for identifying this movement. This single character is sometimes used to define analytic philosophy as "linguistic philosophy" or "linguistic analysis". It has even been proposed to classify analysts by their relationship to language, followers and critics of natural language or languages ​​built, formalistic and linguists, each group has its extremists and moderates. Formalists among constructionists (Lesnievski, Lukasiewicz, Carnap) consider only languages ​​provide built unique formulation of ideas, the reformers (Russel, Kotarbinski, Ajdukiewicz) intend to restructure the language according to the form informed, say the logic of Principia Mathematica. Among linguists, some willing to rectify the ordinary use (Ryle, Strawson, Hampshire), others found in the descriptive analysis of detailed conceptual subtleties of the common language at least a preliminary any philosophical examination (Austin). This concern "logic" (or linguistic), broadly distinguishes analytic philosophy to other philosophies of Cartesian or recommend transcendental analysis as research or intelligible foundation in philosophy at the same time, it the opposes the philosophy of the whole or absolute Hegelian synthesis, the Platonic synopsis. Appears when, in 1903, the test Refutation of Idealism The Moore, announcing a private revolt against Hegelianism of Bradley and McTaggart, he was hailed as the first writing of analytic philosophy.

      Analytic philosophy can be characterized by the fact that finally, among all modes of relating to the world, it does consider that the mode of apprehension concept, the only one that is objectively open. The ultimate philosophical task concerns the relationship between the way things happen in the world and the nature of our conceptual framework. And, since the natural or formal language use is considered the key point of contact with the conceptual reality, the only place where the operation mode of concepts is analyzed, it is clear that Russell could speak of scientific method in philosophy. Not that it concerns the empirical, but the trial analytical immediately intersubjective criticism based on the use of new resources of mathematical logic, made ​​available to the philosopher, and the identification deliberate Bedeutung (meaning) to Wortbedeutung (meaning of the word). This completes distinguish it from other philosophies design analysis as an inspection species or as a description of an existential dimension.

3. Phases, poles and types of analysis:

        Nevertheless, analysts do not have the same theory of this practice, its object type, and its results. Is associated with analytical theories or metaphysical view that Russell called "logical atomism" is supposed anti-metaphysical doctrines with logical positivism, or with a design background without dogmatic than Moore and later Oxfordian, or even with a kind of radical nominalism as Ryle. Same diversity as the end of the analysis: Wittgenstein (Tractatus) does not state that the ultimate return can be carried out, it does not say what final elements, the beginning, the logical positivists' s more involved in identifying sensitive content. But if some other people want and the skeleton of the new logic language provides the formal structure of statements ultimate Moore before Wittgenstein second way (Investigations) undertakes no obligation on the nature of the evidence or statements on the form. Finally, the Oxford school no longer binds to any model (pattern) that would reveal. A brief history is therefore necessary to discover behind the phases of the movement forms of analysis.

       After a period preanalytical dominated by neo-Aristotelian realism of the two disciples of Brentano (Meinong and Russell), are emerging at the beginning of the century a line of development in England and Poland. The theory of objects Meinong and contribution to the philosophy of mind Twardowski prepare the reaction Russell. As the theory of externality relationships it was to defeat the monistic idealism, his method of logical constructs his theory of descriptions, propositional functions and formal analysis which shall be developed to solve the logical difficulties of radical realism.

       In Poland, the generation of the Lvov-Warsaw School learns to read the Principles of Mathematics (1903), develops own ideas in relation to the Principia Mathematica (1910), and soon against them. Poles take up the analytical work on the foundation of mathematics and logic where Russell abandoned. The nominalist interpretation and pragmatist and Tarski Lesnievski be reintroduced by them in the Anglo-Saxon world, where they act on recent research Quine and Goodman. The homogeneity and continuity of the Polish branch (the influence of Wittgenstein is almost zero) makes a move without another story that his encounter with Marxism he enters certain habits analytic, before being disposed of as philosophy independent.

         In England, the movement takes shape in Moore and Russell is a completion and as a provisional classicism with the Tractatus (1921), opens with logical positivism in the early thirties ... While in Poland and Lukasiewicz Kotarbinski kept their distance with respect to the Vienna Circle, Ayer succeeded conjunction with analytic practice saving the best of the English empiricist tradition. The movement tries to reflect in its presuppositions in the first analytical controversies. Wisdom is the philosophy of analytic philosophy. Stebbing systematized procedures. Along with self-criticism of Wittgenstein called classical analysis stalled. A number of articles published before World War II announce an expansion (or denaturation) analysis elucidation become less reductive than descriptive. Certainly, the continuity between cambridgiens and Oxfordian seems assured at Ryle, whose Theory of Meaning (1957) with Ayer's article, "Philosophy and Language" (1963), are among the best tradeoffs movement as a whole. But we think the United States in 1967, it shows signs of slowing down, either by processing and return to a more traditional problems, and Strawson in Hampshire, or by exhaustion of a certain philosophical problems, in Quine who denounces the myth of the signification, especially in Goodman.

         It could be the history of analytic philosophy by the history of the idea of ​​significance during this period. It has become an indispensable tool of philosophical discourse. Analyzing thinking as it is meaningful, capable of being true or false. However, Frege, the first modern logician after Stuart Mill to give a general theory on the occasion of his research on the rating of quantifiers, judge ordinary language unfit to adequately express the generality paradoxically capable of names without denotation and sentences without truth value. It was for him to choose one pole of reference to base his philosophy of meaning, and thus one of the types of analysis: the reference to languages ​​built logically perfect. As philosophical investigations are conceptual research that focuses on the logic of expressions, we will consider that the rationality of operation shall be taken to the new formal logic. It is she who provides the overall framework of the analysis. But we can also consider that it is our common thinking and everyday that gives rise to the major problems of philosophy, much better than the fact contemplate the limited repertoire of types of operation logic of concepts of a formal system, which makes us blind to the diversity of modes appear logical that ordinary concepts: the analysis should be clarification of ordinary language.

          In both cases, the analytical task envelope always an effort to transcribe in terms more appropriate statements found confusing. A sentence (a class of sentences) is supposed analyzed if we can translate sentence by another synonymous own to make explicit the real complexity of the concepts used in short, an ideal paraphrase, an overhaul of the verbal form, clean to show the logical affinities of the proposition expressed, discarding affinities illusory. It is a kind of translation, but within a single language, a less explicit form in a more explicit form, a form in a non-misleading misleading. The aim is not purely linguistic. The issue is usually a definition of "real." The term of the analysis is a propositional form that manifests the true structure of facts or thoughts expressed.

     So depending on which party takes the general form sentences cloudy, the type of language paraphrases and the nature of the term analysis, as they are only back in elementary or elementary input, we will to distinguish several forms of analysis. We develop four, which are historically represented: the first two formal and reductive, are classical analysis, the other two, informal and descriptive, sometimes called reserve elucidated.